The Significance of Regulatory Orientation in Occupational Health and Safety Offshore by Paterson, John
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 2 Learning From Disaster: Lessons for the Future
From the Gulf of Mexico
Article 8
5-1-2011
The Significance of Regulatory Orientation in
Occupational Health and Safety Offshore
John Paterson
University of Aberdeen School of Law, j.paterson@abdn.ac.uk
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Paterson, The Significance of Regulatory Orientation in Occupational Health and Safety Offshore,
38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 369 (2011), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol38/iss2/8
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REGULATORY 
ORIENTATION IN OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH AND SAFETY OFFSHORE 
John Paterson* 
Abstract: The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico has 
led to calls for the United States’ prescriptive regulatory approach to off-
shore safety to be replaced with something closer to the safety case regime 
that was introduced in the United Kingdom following the Piper Alpha 
disaster in the North Sea in 1988. This Article traces the evolution of off-
shore safety regulation in the United Kingdom to explain the reasons for 
the abandonment of prescriptive regulation in favour of the safety case 
approach, and to outline the key features of the latter regime. Noting 
both the apparent strengths and weaknesses of the safety case, this Article 
concludes that while there may be good reasons for avoiding a wholesale 
transplant of the United Kingdom’s approach, there may equally be im-
portant lessons to be drawn from the long and often difficult evolution of 
offshore safety regulation in that jurisdiction. 
Introduction 
 In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, unprece-
dented attention is being paid to an area of law that would previously 
have been obscure for most. The regulation of health and safety in the 
offshore oil and gas industry is clearly a matter of considerable techni-
cal sophistication1 that at other times remains the preserve of the spe-
cialists directly involved. But when something goes wrong on the scale 
that it did in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, it becomes apparent that 
such regulation is not only a matter of concern to those on the installa-
tions, but also to a much wider population indeed. As other contribu-
tions to this issue testify, the impact on the people of the Gulf Coast has 
already been significant, and the full effects both of the spill and the 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2011, John Paterson, Reader in Law and Co-Director of the Centre for Energy Law 
at the University of Aberdeen, UK. 
1 See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore 
Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 
73, 251 (2011) [hereinafter BP Commission Report]. 
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clean-up effort may take some time to become evident.2 In such cir-
cumstances, as the investigation into what has happened proceeds, it is 
by no means unusual for the form and content of the relevant regula-
tion to come into question, along with the identity and responsibility of 
the regulator, and this event is no exception. In the months following 
the disaster, the regulatory architecture has already undergone reform. 
The various functions of the former Minerals Management Service— 
promotion of energy development, regulation of offshore drilling, and 
the collection of revenues—have been separated out among three dis-
tinct bodies under the Department of the Interior, on the basis that 
there was previously a conflict of interest among them.3 Whether that is 
a sufficient adjustment to the regulatory architecture is an open ques-
tion, but is beyond the scope of this Article. Attention is now turning to 
the question of regulatory orientation, with a number of observers sug-
gesting that in place of the detailed prescriptive approach to offshore 
safety regulation,4 the United States should consider the goal-oriented 
safety case approach of the United Kingdom.5 This would constitute a 
radical reorientation of the regulatory approach currently used on the 
Outer Continental Shelf,6 and before any such step is taken it would be 
imperative to have a clear idea of how this approach has worked in the 
United Kingdom. Is this really an approach to regulation that would 
produce significant improvements? Or does its placing of the responsi-
bility for the development of detail on the operator actually increase 
risk? Might it even be argued, as Rena Steinzor does in this issue, that 
BP’s familiarity with the safety case approach on the U.K. Continental 
Shelf (UKCS) was a factor in that operator’s attitude to risk that pro-
duced such disastrous results in the Gulf of Mexico?7 
 In order to contribute to this debate, this Article provides a review 
of the evolution of health and safety regulation on the UKCS in order 
to explain how and why a detailed prescriptive approach similar to the 
existing U.S. system was ultimately abandoned in favor of the goal-
                                                                                                                      
2 See id. at 173–95. 
3 See U.S. Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3299, Establishment of the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue (May 19, 2010), available at  http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/ 
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475; BP Commission Report, supra note 
1, at 55–56, 254. 
4 See generally 30 C.F.R. pt. 250 (2010). 
5 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 251–52. 
6 See id. at 250–54. 
7 See Rena Steinzor, Lessons from the North Sea: Should “Safety Cases” Come to America?, 38 
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 417, 420–21 (2011). 
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setting, safety case approach in place today.8 It then offers an account 
of what the new regime involves in practice, as well as the lessons that 
have been learned during its implementation and the adjustments that 
have been necessary.9 While undoubtedly an approach that has pro-
duced positive results, there have in recent years been indications that 
call into question its complete efficacy.10 Do these indicate a funda-
mental flaw and perhaps lend weight to Rena Steinzor’s argument? Or 
do they point to another aspect of a basically sound regulatory orienta-
tion that simply requires improvement? This Article argues in favor of 
the latter position and thus suggests that there are lessons to be drawn 
from the U.K. experience that could be of value as the United States 
considers what sort of regulatory reform may still be required.11 
                                                                                                                     
I. The Early Evolution of the United Kingdom’s  
Approach to Offshore Safety 
 The challenge for any government in regulating the offshore oil 
and gas industry is considerable. Not only does the industry possess 
significantly greater knowledge and expertise than regulators,12 but it is 
also characterized by constant technological progress as it endeavours 
both to increase the percentage of hydrocarbons recoverable from any 
reservoir, and to find and extract oil and gas from ever more difficult 
circumstances.13 Thus, not only does a government dealing with the 
industry for the first time start at a significant cognitive disadvantage, 
but it then embarks on a race to keep pace with developments that it 
realistically has no hope of winning.14 The experience of the United 
Kingdom in this regard is no exception. Tracing that experience is in-
structive because the United Kingdom has confronted the reality of its 
regulatory shortcomings on several occasions, and has had to reorient 
its approach radically more than once. 
 When the United Kingdom became aware in the early 1960s that 
natural gas might be present under its continental shelf, its goal to de-
rive economic benefit as quickly as possible prompted it to take short-
 
8 See infra Part I. 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See, e.g., Health & Safety Exec., Key Programme 3: Asset Integrity Programme 
5 (2007) [hereinafter KP 3 Report], available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/kp3.pdf. 
11 See infra Conclusion. 
12 See, e.g., BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 67, 76–77. 
13 See, e.g., id. at 73, 251. 
14 See, e.g., id. at 73. 
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cuts in establishing the legal regime for its exploitation.15 Once the Con-
tinental Shelf Act of 1964 was passed, the United Kingdom simply lifted 
the existing onshore regulatory regime for the exploration and produc-
tion of oil and gas, which dated from the 1930s,16 and transferred it to 
the offshore environment.17 This vested all mineral resources in the 
Crown and required the relevant government department to issue a li-
cense to explore or exploit mineral resources.18 The grant of licenses 
for onshore operations had been governed by regulations passed in 
1935.19 These regulations contained Model License Clauses and were 
more or less copied verbatim for the new offshore licenses.20 
                                                                                                                     
 The Model Clauses required that: “[t]he Licensee shall comply 
with any instructions from time to time given by the Minister in writing 
for securing the safety health and welfare of persons employed in or 
about the licensed area.”21 The United Kingdom’s lack of experience 
and expertise was immediately evident when the Minister instructed 
the industry to follow the Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe 
Practice in the Petroleum Industry (“IP Code”).22 There were, there-
fore, neither any substantive legal provisions relating to safety issues, 
nor any detailed oversight of this aspect on the part of the govern-
ment.23 And the inadequacy of this hands-off approach to offshore 
safety became clear within a very short time when the Sea Gem drilling 
rig operated by BP sank in December 1965, resulting in the loss of thir-
teen lives.24 
 
15 See W.G. Carson, The Other Price of Britain’s Oil: Safety and Control in 
the North Sea 140–41 (1982). 
16 See generally Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 36. 
17 See Continental Shelf Act, 1964, c. 29, § 1. 
18 See id. § 1(1)–(3). 
19 See generally Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1935, Stat. R. & O. 1935/426. 
20 Compare id. sched. 2 (model license clauses for the onshore Petroleum Production 
Regulations), with Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regu-
lations, 1964, S.I. 1964/708, sched. 2 (model license clauses for the offshore Petroleum 
Production Regulations). 
21 See Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations, 
1964, S.I. 1964/708, sched. 2, ¶ 18. 
22 See Ministry of Power, Report of the Inquiry into the Causes of the Acci-
dent to the Drilling Rig Sea Gem, 1967, Cmnd. 3409, ¶ 6.2 (U.K.) [hereinafter Sea 
Gem Report]. The IP Code was issued in October 1964. See id. at i. 
23 See id. ¶ 8.2 (noting that the IP Code delineates only practical recommendations 
and is not regulatory in nature). 
24 W.G. Carson, The Other Price of Britain’s Oil: Regulating Safety on Offshore Oil Installa-
tions in the British Sector of the North Sea, 4 Contemp. Crises 239, 250 (1980). 
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 The Sea Gem Inquiry (the “Inquiry”), established by the Minister 
of Power,25 lacked formal powers because an offshore installation was 
only regulated by license, and fell outside of any statutory authority.26 
Its recommendations led in due course to the establishment of a com-
prehensive prescriptive regulatory regime for safety offshore.27 The 
approach to safety offshore at the time of the Sea Gem accident un-
doubtedly possessed some obvious weaknesses. Insofar as the IP Code 
lacked legal authority, it would have been difficult to enforce; the only 
sanction open to the Minister in the event of a failure to comply with 
the Code would appear to have been the potentially grossly dispropor-
tionate revocation of the license.28 The quasi-contractual nature of the 
license29 would have made it impossible for the Minister to intervene—
even assuming that he had some appropriate regulatory apparatus to 
effect an inspection—where unsafe activities were being carried out by 
actors not party to the license, a potentially wide group given the extent 
of subcontracting in the offshore industry.30 
 The Inquiry’s recommendation with respect to a prescriptive regu-
latory approach undoubtedly addressed these shortcomings.31 However 
the Inquiry’s unique rationale provides an early insight into why such 
prescriptive rules are attractive to lawyers and regulators, without nec-
essarily being well-adapted to a fast-developing and technologically in-
tensive industry. In short, while the Inquiry recognized that the IP 
Code fell short of legislative and regulatory standards and thus called 
for “a code of [statutory] authority supported by credible sanctions,”32 
it equally found that the offshore industry was “so large and the eviden-
tial material so complex” that “generalisations could well be both inapt 
                                                                                                                      
25 Id. at 1. 
26 See Sea Gem Report, supra note 22, at 1–2. 
27 Carson, supra note 24, at 251. 
28 See Sea Gem Report, supra note 22, at 2. 
29 See Greg Gordon, Petroleum Licensing, in Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and 
Emerging Trends 27, 27–68 (Greg Gordon & John Paterson eds., 2007). 
30 See R.W. Bentham, The United Kingdom Offshore Safety Regime: Before and After Piper Alpha, 
9 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 273, 275 (1991); Steve Hargreaves, BP, Subcontractors: Spill 
is the Other Guy’s Fault, CNNMoney (May 11, 2010, 5:22 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/ 
05/11/news/companies/BP_hearings/index.htm (illustrating the extent of subcontracting 
in the offshore oil industry). 
31 See Carson, supra note 24, at 250–51 (noting that the Inquiry’s recommendation led 
to the replacement of the contract-based licensing system with a more powerful prescrip-
tive system under statutory law). 
32 Sea Gem Report, supra note 22, ¶ 10.2(i) (“In some other countries, notably the 
United States of America, there are statutory provisions . . . . The Tribunal is of the opin-
ion that a code of similar authority . . . ought to be made applicable to British structures of 
like kind.”). 
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and dangerous.”33 Nevertheless, that is precisely what it was recom-
mending should be done in the context of a detailed statutory code.34 
 This, then, was the background to the Mineral Workings (Offshore 
Installations) Act 1971 (the “1971 Act”), which was the statute eventu-
ally enacted to enable the detailed safety regulations called for by the 
Sea Gem Inquiry.35 Legislators reasoned that addressing details of the 
program in secondary legislation would allow regulations to be 
changed more rapidly to keep pace with evolving technology.36 While 
the legislators clearly had some idea of the complexity of the task they 
were giving to the regulators, even they would surely have been sur-
prised that it took some eight years for the full set of regulations to be 
produced.37 Between 1972 and 1980, eleven statutory instruments were 
introduced.38 It is noteworthy that it was 1976 before any regulation 
dealing with substantive issues of health and safety appeared39—over a 
decade after the Sea Gem disaster—and even this was regarded later by 
the regulator as having been done “hurriedly” and on the basis of “in-
adequate consultations.”40 Regulations dealing with emergency proce-
dures did not appear until later in 1976,41 and the full set42 was not in 
place until after some of the large, first-generation platforms were in 
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. ¶ 10.1. 
34 See id. ¶¶ 10.1–.3 (finding that a prescriptive statutory system is preferred despite 
the complex and multifarious nature of the industry). 
35 Bentham, supra note 30, at 275. 
36 See 816 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1971) 648 (U.K.) (statement by the Under-
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry). 
37 See Carson, supra note 15, at 154–55 (noting that even the Under-Secretary of State 
expected to publish the regulations more quickly). 
38 See infra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
39 Offshore Installations (Operational Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations, 1976, 
S.I. 1976/1019. 
40 See Dep’t of Energy, Offshore Safety: Report of the Committee, 1980, Cmnd. 
7866, submission 37, ¶ 7 (U.K.) [hereinafter Burgoyne Report]. 
41 Offshore Installations (Emergency Procedures) Regulations, 1976, S.I. 1976/1542. 
42 Offshore Installations (Registration) Regulations, 1972, S.I. 1972/702; Offshore Instal-
lations (Managers) Regulations, 1972, S.I. 1972/703; Offshore Installations (Logbooks and 
Registration of Death) Regulations, 1972, S.I. 1972/1542; Offshore Installations (Inspectors 
and Casualties) Regulations, 1973, S.I. 1973/1842; Offshore Installations (Construction and 
Survey) Regulations, 1974, S.I. 1974/289; Offshore Installations (Public Inquiries) Regula-
tions, 1974, S.I. 1974/338; Offshore Installations (Operational Safety, Health and Welfare) 
Regulations, 1976, S.I. 1976/1019; Offshore Installations (Emergency Procedures) Regula-
tions, 1976, S.I. 1976/1542; Offshore Installations (Life-saving Appliances) Regulations, 1977, 
S.I. 1977/486; Offshore Installations (Fire-fighting Equipment) Regulations, 1978, S.I. 
1978/611; Offshore Installations (Well Control) Regulations, 1980, S.I. 1980/1759. 
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place and producing from the North Sea’s largest fields.43 Very signifi-
cantly, regulations dealing with well control were the last to appear in 
1980.44 
 The difficulties attending the prescriptive regulatory orientation un-
der the 1971 Act were therefore already becoming apparent, and prob-
lems with the regulatory architecture were also beginning to emerge. 
While responsibility for health and safety offshore under the 1971 Act 
was transferred between a number of departments, observers of the in-
dustry have noted that this responsibility always went hand in hand with 
granting exploration and production licenses, leading to a potential 
conflict of interest.45 For most of the period between the passing of the 
1971 Act and the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster, this dual—and 
potentially conflicted—responsibility lay with the Department of En-
ergy’s Petroleum Engineering Division (PED).46 
 Interestingly, these problems of regulatory architecture and orien-
tation were almost concurrently under review in relation to health and 
safety in onshore industries.47 As the 1971 Act was passing through Par-
liament, a government-sponsored committee chaired by Lord Robens 
was considering the regulation of occupational health and safety gen-
erally.48 Reporting in June 1972,49 the Robens Committee essentially 
called into question the assumptions about safety regulation that un-
derpinned the newly adopted approach offshore.50 The Committee was 
concerned that: (1) the detailed prescriptive approach had the effect of 
                                                                                                                      
43 For example, production began from the Forties field in 1975, from Brent in 1976, 
from Piper in 1976, and from Ninian in 1978. The Geology of Scotland 463 (Nigel H. 
Trewin ed., 4th ed. 2002). 
44 Offshore Installations (Well Control) Regulations, 1980, S.I. 1980/1759. 
45 See Carson, supra note 15, at 163–66; Bentham, supra note 30, at 276; Kenneth 
Miller, Piper Alpha and the Cullen Report, 20 Indus. L.J. 176, 178–79 (1991). 
46 See Carson, supra note 15, at 163–64 (noting that the PED came into existence in 
1977, taking over the potentially conflicting responsibility for both offshore safety and 
licensing); Dep’t of Energy, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, 1990, 
Cm. 1310, ¶ 15.2 (U.K.) [hereinafter Cullen Report] (explaining that the PED retained 
this responsibility leading up to and in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster). The 
regulatory structure in the United States leading up to the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
presented a similar conflict, as the Minerals Management Service possessed sole responsi-
bility for regulatory oversight, as well as leasing, permitting, and revenue collection. See BP 
Commission Report, supra note 1, at 56, 254. 
47 See Miller, supra note 45, at 178. 
48 See id. 
49 See generally Comm. on Safety & Health at Work, Report: 1970–72, 1972, Cmnd. 
5034 (U.K.). 
50 See id. ¶ 28 (“[P]erhaps [the] most fundamental defect of the statutory system is sim-
ply that there is too much law.”). 
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producing too much health and safety law, and of giving the impression 
that health and safety was a matter of governmental rather than indi-
vidual responsibility; (2) it produced law that was irrelevant to real 
problems; and (3) it depended on a large number of different industry-
specific regulators which produced problems of coherence in the ap-
proach to health and safety at work.51 The overall conclusion was that: 
There are severe practical limits on the extent to which progressively 
better standards of safety and health at work can be brought about 
through negative regulation by external agencies. We need a more ef-
fectively self-regulating system. This calls for the acceptance and 
exercise of appropriate responsibilities at all levels within in-
dustry and commerce. It calls for better systems of safety or-
ganisation, for more management initiatives, and for more in-
volvement of workpeople themselves. The objectives of future 
policy must therefore include not only increasing the effec-
tiveness of the state’s contribution to safety and health at work 
but also, and more importantly, creating the conditions for 
more effective self-regulation.52 
 This starkly different approach to health and safety at work led to 
the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (the “1974 Act”).53 The 
1974 Act embodied the non-prescriptive and goal-setting approach to 
regulation proposed by Robens, and also did away with industry-specific 
regulators in favour of a single body, the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE).54 This very different regulatory approach to health and safety 
was a challenge to those already engaged with the difficult task of draft-
ing detailed regulations for the offshore industry under the 1971 Act.55 
Of all the possible responses, the one regulators ultimately chose was 
particularly unfortunate. It involved a partial application of the 1974 
Act56 simultaneous with the application of the 1971 Act and its detailed 
prescriptive regulations, with the responsibility for both resting with the 
                                                                                                                      
51 See id. ¶¶ 28, 30, 32–33. 
52 Id. ¶ 41. 
53 See Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶ 16.7. 
54 See id. ¶ 16.8. 
55 See id. ¶ 16.36. 
56 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Application Outside Great Britain) Order, 
1977, S.I. 1977/1232 (applying the general duty from the 1974 Act on the part of the em-
ployer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of em-
ployees). 
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offshore industry’s own regulator, the PED.57 At best this was untidy, at 
worst it was incoherent. Nor was the opportunity taken to resolve the 
inconsistencies when, in the aftermath of the Ekofisk Bravo blowout in 
the Norwegian sector in 1977, a further committee58 was established by 
the U.K. government to look at offshore safety.59 The Burgoyne Com-
mittee, while undoubtedly identifying the problems that arose from at-
tempted implementation of two inconsistent regulatory regimes, did 
not follow these observations to their logical conclusion and recom-
mend bringing the regulation of offshore health and safety into line 
with the new approach onshore.60 Instead, the Burgoyne Committee 
kept faith both with the problematic dual implementation of the 1971 
Act and 1974 Act regimes and with the potentially conflicted industry-
specific regulator.61 The tenacity of the PED in hanging onto a regula-
tory role62 perhaps explains the suggestion made by the dissenting 
members of the Burgoyne Committee that between the regulator and 
the industry there was the “possibility of shared values and membership 
of closed groups.”63 
                                                                                                                      
57 See Carson, supra note 15, at 207–08 (explaining that the North Sea oil industry had 
been partially exempted from regulations under the 1974 Act and that the PED retained 
safety inspection responsibility); Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶¶ 16.10–.11 (explaining 
that only selected portions of the 1974 Act itself—not the regulations passed thereunder—
would be applicable to offshore installations). The PED carried out the HSE’s inspection 
function under an agency agreement between the HSE and the Department of Energy. See 
Miller, supra note 45, at 178. For the agency agreement, see Burgoyne Report, supra note 
40, app. 11. 
58 That further committee was called the Burgoyne Committee, and its terms of refer-
ence were as follows: 
To consider so far as they are concerned with safety, the nature, coverage and 
effectiveness of the Department of Energy’s regulations governing the explo-
ration, development and production of oil and gas offshore and their admini-
stration and enforcement. To consider and assess the role of the Certifying 
Authorities. To present its report, conclusions and any recommendations as 
soon as possible. 
Burgoyne Report, supra note 40, ¶ 1.1. 
59 See Carson, supra note 15, at 195. 
60 See Miller, supra note 45, at 178–79. 
61 See id. 
62 See Carson, supra note 15, at 202. 
63 Burgoyne Report, supra note 40, at 59 (“Note of Dissent by Mr. Lyons and Mr. 
Miller”). 
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II. The Piper Alpha Disaster, the Cullen Inquiry, and the Safety 
Case Approach 
A. The Piper Alpha Disaster and the Cullen Report 
 The significance of the opportunity missed by the Burgoyne Com-
mittee became apparent some eight years after the completion of its 
report. On July 6, 1988, a series of explosions and subsequent fires al-
most entirely destroyed the Piper Alpha oil production platform in the 
North Sea.64 167 men were killed, making this by far the worst accident 
in the history of the offshore industry in terms of lives lost.65 An inquiry, 
chaired by Lord Cullen, a senior Scottish judge, was asked to answer two 
questions: “What were the causes and circumstances of the disaster . . . 
and . . . [w]hat should be recommended with a view to the preservation 
of life and the avoidance of similar accidents in the future?”66 
 The answer to these deceptively simple questions emerged in an 
extremely thorough two-volume report that painted an unedifying pic-
ture of safety on the UKCS.67 The disaster was caused primarily by a 
failure of the permit to work (PTW) system, particularly in the context 
of communication between shifts.68 This failure allowed equipment to 
be used when maintenance work on it had not been completed, result-
ing in an escape of gas and an explosion.69 
 An already serious incident was exacerbated by several other fac-
tors, which even individually would have raised serious doubts about the 
fitness for purpose of the then-current regulatory regime. First, two sis-
ter platforms that shared pipeline infrastructure with the Piper Alpha 
continued to pump hydrocarbons after the initial explosion, thus feed-
ing the fires.70 Second, the Offshore Installation Manager attempted 
“no initiative in an attempt to save life.”71 Third, the initial explosion 
destroyed or incapacitated emergency systems, such as fire control.72 
Fourth, despite the fact that, by chance, a fire-fighting vessel was close by 
in addition to the platform’s dedicated standby vessel, neither effectively 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶¶ 4.1–.17. 
65 See id. ¶ 2.1; John M.T. Balmer, The BP Deepwater Horizon Débâcle and Corporate Brand 
Exuberance, 18 J. Brand Mgmt. 97, 100 (2010). 
66 See Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶ 1.1. 
67 See generally  id.; infra notes 69–77 and accompanying text. 
68 See Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶¶ 6.188–.194, 11.1–.14. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. ¶¶ 7.34–.35, 7.47. The two sister platforms were Claymore and Tartan. See id. 
71 See id. ¶ 8.35. 
72 See id. 
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mitigated the disaster.73 Lord Cullen criticized the platform’s operator, 
Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd., as being unprepared for a ma-
jor emergency, and for having adopted a superficial attitude to such 
risks.74 The appropriate safety arrangements were frequently not in 
place, and even when present were often ignored—the PTW system be-
ing a clear example.75 The regulator was also the subject of stern criti-
cism. Lord Cullen described the PED’s inspections as “superficial to the 
point of being of little use as a test of safety on the platform”76 and not 
really an effective means of assessing the management of safety.77 Taken 
together, these criticisms essentially undermined the assumptions on 
which the existing regulatory approach was based. 
B. Safety Case: The Move from Prescriptive to Goal-Setting Regulation 
 Lord Cullen made 106 recommendations with regard to the im-
provement of the regulation of safety offshore.78 In terms of regulatory 
architecture, he recommended removal of responsibility from the PED 
and its transfer to the HSE.79 With regard to regulatory orientation, Cul-
len’s approach called for the operator of each installation on the UKCS 
to submit a “safety case” to the HSE.80 This document would make the 
case to the regulator that the installation was safe both in terms of its 
design and its operation.81 It would thus demonstrate that certain objec-
tives had been met, including: (1) the operator’s safety management 
system is adequate to ensure the safe design and the operation of the 
installation; (2) it utilizes safe equipment; (3) potential major hazards to 
the installation are identified, and preventive or mitigation measures 
adopted; and (4) there is adequate provision to ensure, in the event of a 
major emergency affecting the installation, a temporary safe refuge for 
personnel and their full evacuation, escape, and rescue.82 
 To be clear, this approach involved an abandonment of any notion 
that safety rules developed by government agencies, no matter how 
flexible the form, could provide a detailed and comprehensive code 
                                                                                                                      
73 Id. ¶¶ 9.41–.42, 9.49. 
74 Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶ 14.52. 
75 See id. 
76 Id. ¶ 15.48. 
77 See id. ¶ 15.50. 
78 Id. at 387. 
79 Id. at 392 (Recommendation 25). 
80 Cullen Report, supra note 46, at 387 (Recommendation 1). 
81 Id. at 387 (Recommendation 2(i)). 
82 Id. at 387–88 (Recommendation 2). 
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covering all aspects of the industry.83 In its place, Cullen placed the key 
responsibility on the operator. The latter would be required by means of a 
“Formal Safety Assessment” to identify risks to occupational health and 
safety, both catastrophic and mundane; to show to the regulator, includ-
ing where necessary by means of “Quantified Risk Assessment,” that 
such risks had been minimized; and to indicate in practical terms how 
this risk minimization had been or would be achieved.84 Lest there be 
any doubt about the extent of this shift in thinking, Cullen stated that “a 
regulator cannot be expected to assume direct responsibility for the on-
going management of safety . . . [this] is and remains in the hands of 
the operator.”85 This approach, of course, implied that the orientation 
of safety regulations would change. Cullen wanted the existing prescrip-
tive regulations to be replaced as far as possible with goal-setting regula-
tions.86 He was concerned that prescriptive regulation had actually con-
tributed to problems insofar as it encouraged a compliance mentality 
rather than the sort of workplace-specific assessment of risks envisaged 
by the 1974 Act.87 According to Cullen, prescriptive regulations were ill-
suited to potential risks arising from the interaction of components, as 
had been the case with the Piper Alpha disaster.88 Insofar as Cullen sup-
ported the view of one witness to the Inquiry who suggested that safety 
could not be legislated,89 one may readily appreciate the extent to 
which there was a break with the pre-existing approach. 
                                                                                                                      
83 See id. ¶ 21.4. 
84 Id. ¶¶ 17.40, 17.53. 
85 Id. ¶ 21.4. 
86 Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶ 21.69–.70. The recommendation was that the Con-
struction and Survey Regulations, the Fire Fighting Regulations, the Life-Saving Appli-
ances Regulations, and the Emergency Procedures Regulations should be revoked and 
replaced by: 
(i) Construction Regulations, covering inter alia the structure and layout of 
the installation and its accommodation; (ii) Plant and Equipment Regula-
tions, covering inter alia plant and equipment on the installation and in par-
ticular those handling hydrocarbons; (iii) Fire and Explosion Protection 
Regulations, covering inter alia both active and passive fire protection and ex-
plosion protection; and (iv) Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Regulations, cov-
ering inter alia emergency procedures, life-saving appliances, evacuation, es-
cape, and rescue. 
Id. Each of these sets of regulations should include goal-setting regulations as their main 
or primary provisions and should be supported by guidance notes giving non-mandatory 
advice. Id. at ¶¶ 21.67, 21.71. 
87 See id. ¶ 21.51. 
88 See id. ¶ 21.42. 
89 Id. ¶ 21.4. The witness was Mr. R.E. McKee, Chairman and Managing Director of 
Conoco (UK) Ltd. Id. 
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 The Government accepted all of the 106 recommendations.90 The 
foundation for Cullen’s new regulatory orientation was laid by the Off-
shore Safety Act 1992,91 which finally extended the Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 offshore in its entirety, and permitted regulations to 
be made to repeal those made under the Mineral Workings (Offshore 
Installations) Act 1971.92 There then followed the Offshore Installa-
tions (Safety Case) Regulations 1992,93 requiring operators to prepare 
safety cases for each installation on the UKCS,94 which the HSE must 
accept before operations are permitted.95 The responsible party pre-
paring the safety case has to include sufficient particulars to demon-
strate that: (1) the management system is adequate to ensure that rele-
vant statutory provisions would be complied with; (2) adequate 
arrangements are in place for auditing and reporting; (3) all hazards 
with the potential to cause a major accident are identified; and (4) risks 
are evaluated and measures taken to reduce them to the lowest level 
reasonably practicable.96 The idea that the safety case should be a “liv-
ing document”97 was embodied in Regulation 9, which provided that 
an operator or owner should revise the safety case as often as re-
quired.98 If a proposed revision would make the safety case “materially 
different” from the latest version submitted to the regulator, then fur-
ther acceptance by the HSE is required.99 The same regulation also re-
quires resubmission of the safety case every three years and reaccep-
tance by the regulator before operations continue.100 As an indication 
of the extent to which responsibility for the development of detail had 
passed from the regulator to the operator, it is noteworthy that Regula-
tion 10 imposes a duty on the operator or owner to ensure that health 
and safety procedures and arrangements contained in the safety case 
                                                                                                                      
90 Safety on RasGas Alpha, RasGas Mag., Dec. 2006, at 24, 25, available at http://www. 
rasgas.com/rg/files/articles/RGMagazine16.24-27.pdf. For the parliamentary debate, see 
187 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1991) 472–567; 180 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1990) 
329–45. 
91 See generally Offshore Safety Act, 1992, c. 15. 
92 Id. § 1. 
93 Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992, S.I. 1992/2885. 
94 Id. art. 4 ¶ (1). 
95 Id. art. 4 ¶ (2), (5)–(6). 
96 Id. art. 8. This ALARP standard (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) is derived from 
the Health and Safety Work, etc. Act, 1974, c. 37, § 2(2)(a). 
97 Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶ 17.46. 
98 Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992, S.I. 1992/2885, art. 9. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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are actually followed, and should there be a breach of that duty, crimi-
nal liability could arise.101 
                                                                                                                     
 The safety case was, of course, only one component of the new 
regulatory orientation envisaged by Lord Cullen. New goal-setting regu-
lations to replace the existing prescriptive ones were also required.102 
These were introduced progressively between 1995 and 1998.103 At first 
sight, the level of detail in these regulations can give the impression that 
they are really prescriptive rather than goal-setting regulations. On 
closer inspection, however, while it is undoubtedly true that some ele-
ments of prescription remain, significant issues are in fact subject to a 
goal-setting approach. 
III. The Recent Evolution of the Safety Case Approach 
A. 2005 Regulations 
 The 1992 Safety Case Regulations and the supporting goal-setting 
regulations were of course a significant innovation in the offshore envi-
ronment, so it is perhaps not surprising that they did not get everything 
right first time around. Noting difficulties with the operation of the 
1992 regulations, the HSE repealed and replaced them with an up-
dated set in 2005.104 That said, given the flexibility of the safety case 
approach and the fact that the safety case itself was supposed to be a 
living document, it might appear surprising that any such modification 
would be required. The regulator had observed, however, that the 1992 
regulations were increasingly perceived to impose an excessive bureau-
cratic burden.105 Furthermore, even if there had been a significant im-
provement in health and safety offshore in the period since the new 
 
101 Id. reg. 10. 
102 Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶ 21.69. 
103 Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration) 
Regulations, 1995, S.I. 1995/738; Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, 
and Emergency Response) Regulations, 1995, S.I. 1995/743; Pipelines Safety Regulations, 
1996, S.I. 1996/825; Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) 
Regulations, 1996, S.I. 1996/913; Diving at Work Regulations 1997, 1998, S.I. 1997/2776; 
Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations, 1998, S.I. 1998/2307. 
104 Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005, 2006, S.I. 2005/3117. 
105 Health & Safety Comm’n, Proposals to Replace the Offshore Installations 
(Safety Case) Regulations 1992, at 4 (2004). 
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approach was introduced, there appeared to be a diminishing return 
with each successive triennial resubmission of the safety cases.106 
ions.113 
                                                                                                                     
 Under the 2005 regulations, accordingly, the triennial resubmission 
requirement was replaced by a five year “thorough review” with the op-
tion for the HSE to direct otherwise.107 In regards to the problem of 
diminishing returns from the 1992 approach, the 2005 regulations in-
troduced changes to the requirements relating to workforce involve-
ment. The new regulations require the safety case to summarize consul-
tation with the workforce not only with regard to its preparation, but 
also its revision and review.108 The HSE is trying to ensure that the work-
force is directly engaged in the safety case process on an ongoing basis. 
 The HSE also issued new guidance concerning risk assessment.109 
Here the regulator notes that the 1992 regulations focused attention on 
Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA), which often required specialist 
consultants to be involved.110 While this appeared to be useful in the 
post-Piper Alpha era, the HSE states that the understanding of offshore 
risks is now mature. Accordingly, it urges risk assessment to focus on 
adding value and to be management-owned rather than consultant-
owned.111 The guidance notes that risk assessment should be propor-
tionate to the complexity of the problem at hand and the magnitude of 
risk.112 QRA thus applies only where the risk level and the complexity 
of a problem are high, with qualitative and semi-quantitative ap-
proaches being identified as appropriate for lower level situat
 With the appearance of the 2005 regulations, therefore, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the regulatory regime for health and safety at 
 
106 See generally Health & Safety Comm’n, A Strategy for Workplace Health and 
Safety in Great Britain to 2010 and Beyond (2004); Health & Safety Comm’n, supra 
note 105. 
107 Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005, 2006, S.I. 2005/3117, art. 13. 
Note that there is an exception to this rule where there are “material changes” which will still 
require acceptance. See id. art. 14; see also Health & Safety Exec., Offshore Installations 
(Safety Case) Regulations 2005, Regulation 13: Thorough Review of a Safety Case, 
Offshore Information Sheet No. 4/2006 (2006); Offshore Safety Case Handling & Assessment 
Manual Thorough Review Summaries, Health & Safety Executive, http://www.hse.gov.uk/ 
offshore/scham/reviewsummaries.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
108 Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005, 2006, S.I. 2005/3117, sched. 
2, ¶ 3 (amending, consequently, the Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and 
Safety Committees) Regulations, 1989, S.I. 1989/971). 
109 Health & Safety Executive, Guidance on Risk Assessment for Offshore In-
stallations, Offshore Information Sheet No. 3/2006, at 1 (2006). 
110 Id. at 2. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 3. 
113 Id. 
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work offshore had reached a stage of maturity commensurate with the 
maturity of the UKCS as an established hydrocarbon province. In fact, 
there is evidence that the safety case approach recently faced its most 
significant challenge. 
B. Recent Evidence of Problems with the Safety Case Approach? 
 During inspections of offshore installations for efforts to reduce 
hydrocarbon releases between 2000 and 2004, the HSE became con-
cerned that the condition of the infrastructure was deteriorating.114 It 
therefore established an initiative to consider asset integrity, designated 
Key Programme 3 (KP 3).115 The new regulations required the inspec-
tion of some 100 installations on the UKCS, with specific attention paid 
to the maintenance management of safety critical elements.116 Insofar 
as there is a close link between this issue and Lord Cullen’s concept of 
the safety case as a “living document,” the findings of this initiative 
make for troubling reading.117 The inspections found, for example, 
that the quality of maintenance management varied considerably across 
the industry and even between installations operated by the same com-
pany.118 These problems appeared to be due to difficulties in tracking 
which equipment was defective or overdue for maintenance.119 The 
regulator uncovered “a poor understanding across the industry of [the] 
potential impact of degraded, non-safety-critical plant and utility sys-
tems on safety-critical elements in the event of a major accident,”120 
and that “[t]he role of asset integrity and [the] concept of barriers in 
major hazard risk control” was “not well understood.”121 With respect 
to the condition of the infrastructure as a whole, there was some posi-
tive news, as structural integrity and the main hydrocarbon boundary 
were both “reasonably well controlled.”122 However, there were also 
more worrying findings to the extent that other parts of the infrastruc-
ture, such as pipes and valves, were in decline.123 
                                                                                                                      
114 KP 3 Report, supra note 10, at 5. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 See id.; Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992, 1993, S.I. 1992/2885, 
art. 9 (U.K.). 
118 KP 3 Report, supra note 10, at 6. 
119 Id. at 11–13. 
120 Id. at 6, 13. 
121 Id. at 6. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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 The HSE’s explanation for these findings lay in three underlying 
problems relating to learning, the engineering function, and leadership. 
First, in relation to learning, there were problems both of inadequate 
auditing and monitoring and of a lack of processes to allow for embed-
ded learning.124 Second, the engineering function appears to be de-
clining in strength relative to other functions within oil companies.125 
While the HSE did not spell out which other functions engineering had 
lost out to, the inference is that these were financial.126 This conclusion 
is supported by the third underlying problem identified by the regula-
tor—leadership. While senior management must inevitably balance 
safety and financial risks in making spending decisions, the HSE was 
concerned that there was inadequate understanding of the impact on 
such decisions of operating with “degraded [safety critical elements] 
and safety-related equipment.”127 
 Taken together, the findings of the KP 3 Report raise the question 
of how, if the safety case was operating as it was intended to, such a 
situation could have arisen. Do these findings indicate a fatal flaw in the 
safety case approach? Or does the exposure of problems by HSE sug-
gest that the approach remains robust, provided that it is supported by 
a regulator whose attention is appropriately focused? Before these 
questions can be answered, it is necessary to consider what impact the 
events of April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico might themselves have on 
offshore health and safety regulation on the UKCS. 
C. Possible Effects of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster on United Kingdom 
Offshore Safety Regulation 
 Whether or not one is persuaded that oversight by the HSE is suf-
ficient to mitigate any risks associated with the safety case approach, it 
appears certain that there will be no effort on the part of either gov-
ernment or regulator to reverse the trend away from prescriptive regu-
lation on the UKCS.128 Even the occurrence of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster has not shaken the confidence of the various interested parties 
in the suitability of the current regulatory approach. Following the dis-
aster, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change announced 
                                                                                                                      
124 KP 3 Report, supra note 10, at 8. 
125 Id. 
126 See id. at 12. 
127 Id. at 8. 
128 See Press Release, U.K. Dep’t of Energy & Climate Change, UK Increases North Sea 
Rig Inspections ( June 8, 2010), available at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/ 
news/pn10_067/pn10_067.aspx. 
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a review of U.K. law and regulation relating to offshore health and 
safety.129 This review fairly quickly concluded that the existing regime 
was “fit for purpose.”130 There was, however, no denying that lessons 
might be learned, and to this end both the regulator and the industry 
are currently engaged in further investigations. The HSE has estab-
lished the Deepwater Horizon Review Group, which is considering the 
findings of the investigation into the accident with a view to making 
“recommendations as necessary with regard to the control of wells and 
the safety of the exploitation of offshore oil and gas in the UK.”131 Oil 
& Gas UK, the principal body representing the industry on the UKCS, 
has set up the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group, 
bringing together industry, regulators, and trade unions “to provide a 
focal point for the sector’s review of the industry’s practices in the UK, 
in advance of the conclusion of investigations into the Gulf of Mexico 
incident.”132 Finally, at the level of the legislators, the House of Com-
mons Energy and Climate Change Select Committee has heard oral 
evidence and received written submissions from a range of stakeholders 
in relation to deepwater development.133 Their recently published re-
port clearly finds that the United Kingdom’s safety case approach is 
superior to the regulatory regime under which the Deepwater Horizon 
operated in the Gulf of Mexico.134 However, the report concurrently 
found “concern[] that the offshore oil and gas industry is responding 
to disasters, rather than anticipating worst-case scenarios and planning 
for high-consequence, low-probability events,” which is particularly 
troublesome given that the safety case approach was supposed to en-
courage precisely that sort of anticipation and foresight.135 Legislative 
or regulatory change as a result of all these investigations and reviews 
cannot, therefore, be ruled out, but the general impression is that it 
will be business as usual.136 There has been a sense in both government 
                                                                                                                      
 
129 Id. 
130 See id. 
131 Deepwater Horizon Incident in the Gulf of Mexico, Health & Safety Executive, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/deepwater.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
132 Knowledge Centre: Oil Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group (OSPRAG), Oil & 
Gas UK, http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/knowledgecentre/OSPRAG.cfm (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011). 
133 See Energy & Climate Change Comm., UK Deepwater Drilling—Implications 
of the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 2010–11, H.C. 450-I, ¶ 71, available at http://www. 
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/450/450i.pdf. 
134 Id. ¶ 34. 
135 Id. ¶ 35. 
136 See id. It is perhaps not insignificant that this Committee was not only concerned 
with the adequacy of the regulatory regime, but also with knowing more about the contri-
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and industry that the safety case approach on the UKCS makes it less 
likely that an accident like the Deepwater Horizon could occur.137 
                                                                                                                     
 It is a question, however, whether this confidence is shared by 
European Union institutions. Both the European Parliament and the 
European Commission have taken a close interest in what has hap-
pened in the Gulf of Mexico and in any ramifications for the industry 
operating in, or indeed from, the European Union. Each has indicated 
in recent months—through a Parliament resolution and a Commission 
communication, respectively—that legislative change at the European 
Union level may be necessary.138 References in the Parliament resolu-
tion and the Commission communication to existing best practices139 
might, of course, indicate that other Member States will be expected to 
adopt the United Kingdom’s approach. On the other hand, the United 
Kingdom may not be the country these institutions have in mind when 
they refer to existing best practices. The Parliament, for example, 
makes mention of only one Member State in its resolution—the United 
Kingdom—and that is a negative reference to the latest serious injury 
and fatality statistics reported by the HSE.140 As a consequence, it is pos-
sible that the safety case approach itself may be under very close scru-
tiny from Europe in the months ahead, and the European Union may 
reach very different conclusions with very different implications for the 
United Kingdom’s regulatory approach to health and safety offshore.141 
Conclusion 
 The evolution of the regulation of health and safety on the UKCS 
is a rich source of inspiration for any jurisdiction considering reform in 
this regard. The occurrence of serious accidents forced the United 
 
bution that will be made by deepwater resources to the United Kingdom’s energy security. 
See id. ¶ 138. In this regard, it concluded that any moratorium on deepwater drilling on 
the UKCS would harm energy security and diminish the contribution of the offshore oil 
and gas industry to the British economy more generally. See id. 
137 See Deepwater Horizon Incident in the Gulf of Mexico, supra note 131. 
138 See Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: Facing the Challenge of the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities, § 1, SEC (2010) 
1193 final (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Commission Communication]; Resolution of 7 Octo-
ber 2010 on EU Action on Oil Exploration and Extraction in Europe, Eur. Parl. Doc. 
P7_TA(2010)0352 ¶ 16 [hereinafter E.U. Parliament Resolution]. 
139 See, e.g., Commission Communication, supra note 138, at 3, 5. 
140 See E.U. Parliament Resolution, supra note 138, ¶ 25; see also Offshore Safety Statistics Bul-
letin 2009/10, Health & Safety Executive, http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/statistics/ 
tat0910.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
141 See E.U. Parliament Resolution, supra note 138, ¶ 25; see also Offshore Safety Statistics 
Bulletin 2009/10, supra note 140. 
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Kingdom to examine closely the previously existing approaches, and to 
consider what alternatives might represent improvements. As a conse-
quence, over the four-and-a-half decades of hydrocarbon operations on 
the UKCS, three distinct approaches to health and safety regulation 
have been implemented: first, the original self-regulatory approach 
under the license;142 second, the detailed prescriptive approach under 
the 1971 Act and the subsequent regulations;143 and finally, the goal-
setting, safety case approach following Lord Cullen’s post-Piper Alpha 
recommendations.144 The first two approaches each had their short-
comings revealed in the context of a serious accident. The third ap-
proach has not been without its difficulties, but has so far not been 
tested by the occurrence of a major disaster. 
 That is not to say that goal-setting regulation and safety cases have 
been uncontroversial. The problems with asset integrity revealed by the 
HSE in 2007145 could be read as a fundamental questioning of the as-
sumptions underpinning the safety case approach—in particular, the 
notion of the instrument as a living document, subject to ongoing 
modification based on monitoring and review of the operator’s safety 
management system.146 The question, therefore, is whether this prob-
lem fatally undermines the goal-setting, safety case approach, calling 
instead for a further stage of regulatory development. 
 The conclusion reached by this Article is that it does not. It is cer-
tainly the case that the appearance of asset integrity problems is deeply 
troublesome. A failure to properly manage the maintenance of safety 
critical elements and to strike an appropriate balance between safety 
and financial risk could well have been the precursor to a serious acci-
dent. But the first question to be answered by anyone proposing to re-
place the safety case approach is: replace with what? It is not obvious 
that any system would constitute an improvement beyond the current 
approach, nor is it clear that a return to a previous approach would 
unquestionably represent progress. As a consequence, it may be sug-
gested that it is not so much the safety case approach in and of itself 
that is problematic, but rather the way it is implemented.147 The level of 
analysis possible within the confines of this brief Article does not allow 
                                                                                                                      
142 Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1935, Stat. R. & O. 1935/426. 
143 See Bentham, supra note 30, at 275. 
144 See Cullen Report, supra note 46, ¶ 21.69; see also id. ch. 23. 
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more than a relatively superficial appraisal. There is nevertheless clear 
evidence from the 2007 asset integrity report that the degree of free-
dom afforded the industry by the safety case approach allows the de-
ployment of its expertise and experience in the identification of haz-
ards and risks and in their mitigation and control.148 But the 2007 asset 
integrity report equally presents the possibility, even inadvertently, that 
the industry will strike a problematic balance between safety and finan-
cial risks. If there is a lesson from the experience of the 2007 report, 
therefore, it is that the role of the regulator is in no way diminished in 
the context of the safety case approach compared to the prescriptive 
regulatory approach. Rather, a safety-case regulator must be refocused 
on ensuring that the industry remains open to the appropriate range of 
risks faced in the operation of its safety management systems, and does 
not allow the inevitable concern with cost to blind it to the reality of 
safety risks.149 The critic may well conclude that the very possibility that 
such a situation could arise is evidence that a return to prescriptive 
regulation is warranted. However, consider the cognitive burden that 
such an approach imposes on the regulator, compared to the safety 
case approach. Prescribing in detail for the safety of an industry that is 
considerably more complex now than it was when Lord Cullen pre-
pared his report represents an impossible task for any regulator, 
whereas focusing on what it is that the industry is not seeing as it oper-
ates its safety management systems is a much more straightforward de-
mand. As the United States considers whether the changes already 
made to the regulatory architecture, which mirror those in the United 
Kingdom after Piper Alpha, should also be followed by changes to 
regulatory orientation, it should not feel compelled to follow the Brit-
ish example slavishly. There may nevertheless be an opportunity for a 
selective borrowing of some of the regulatory ideas that represent the 
product of a long and difficult evolution on the UKCS. 
 
148 KP 3 Report, supra note 10, at 5. 
149 See id. 
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